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ABSTRACT
Apart from Board of Director, top management, including Chief Executive Officer or Managing Director is also 
considered as an important governance mechanism of the firm. CEO plays a major role in managing and controlling 
business operations, thus his/her succession may significantly affect firm performance. This study aims to examine 
the effect of top management succession on share price. Past studies, which used the event-study methodology to 
evaluate immediate investors’ reactions towards top management succession had their observations done over 
limited time frame (window periods). Succession may impact the share price beyond the window period because the 
investors may use information obtained from financial statements to evaluate new top management capabilities. This 
study contributes to the literature by examining the effects of top management succession on share price at the end 
of financial years. Book value of equity per share (BE) and earnings per share (EPS) on share price is regressed at 
three different points of time; year of top management change (TMC), a year after top management change (TMC_1) 
and post occurrence years of top management change (TMC_C). Findings indicate that BE and EPS are value relevant. 
Findings also indicate that top management succession is not significantly related to changes in share price over a 
short period of time (transition year and a post transition year). However, over the longer period of time (TMC_C), 
our study indicates the top management succession is value relevant. Findings indicate that investors take a longer 
time to appreciate the new top management on their decision makings. Further analysis indicates that BE is regarded 
as value relevant by the investors after incorporating firm with outside successor; while EPS is value relevant for the 
firm with inside successor. This study supports the limited studies in Malaysia which indicate succession events have 
an implication on share price. Findings in this study may contribute towards strategic decision making in corporate 
management of public listed companies in Malaysia, specifically when board of directors are considering the top 
management replacement. 
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INTRODUCTION
Top management positions such as Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO), Managing Director (MD), and Chief 
Operating Officer (COO) are held by important individuals 
who are responsible to set the direction of firm’s 
objectives, make strategic and operational decisions, and 
eventually influence firms’ performance and sustainability 
(Amran, Md Yusof, Ishak & Aripin 2014; Larcker, Miles, 
& Tayan 2014; Ishak & Abdul Latif 2012; Donoher, Reed 
& Storrud-Barnes 2007). Therefore, it is understandably 
agreed that public, specifically investors, will react in 
certain ways when there are announcements of changes 
in the top management position since it indicates firms’ 
future financial performance (Jalal & Prezas 2012), and 
their success or failure (Rhim, Peluchette & Song 2006). 
Financial performance, which is generally a benchmark 
of a managers’ success in improving the welfare of the 
owners, is one of the essential considerations in top 
management turnover (Lindrianasari & Hartono 2012). 
This notion is supported by several studies (example: 
Huson, Malatesta & Parrino 2004; Lindrianasari & 
Hartono 2012; Murphy & Zimmerman 1993; Pourciau 
1993) which demonstrate a significant relationship 
between financial performance and CEO/MD appointments. 
 The selection of new CEO/MD is said as a critical 
decision that influences firm’s direction and effectiveness 
(Karaevli 2007), whereby firm post-performance is 
becoming an important signal about successor’s ability. 
Newly appointed CEO/MD is expected to improve firm 
performance with the implementation of new strategies 
and operation (Barron, Chulkov & Waddell 2011; 
Lindrianasari & Hartono 2012) and increase managerial 
productivity (Huson et al. 2004). As general view propose, 
the improvement of firm’s post succession performance is 
due to replacement of ineffective CEO with a new, more 
capable and competent CEO (Denis & Denis 1995; Ishak 
& Abdul Latif 2012). 
 Prior studies discussed the impacts of top management 
turnover from two related perspectives: capital market 
performance and accounting performance. Studies from 
the capital market performance perspective investigate 
the effect of top management turnover on the changes 
of firms’ share prices over a short period of time (event 
study approach). However, results from this approach 
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are inconclusive (example: Dahya & McConnell 2005; 
Dedman & Lin 2002; Denis & Denis 1995; Setiawan, 
Hananto & Kee 2011), in which investors are uncertain 
whether the announcement indicates a good news or a bad 
news (Setiawan et al. 2011). 
 In a short period of time, the market reaction 
towards CEO/MD succession announcements is driven 
by the characteristics of incumbent and successor, since 
investors’ lack the performance indicators to evaluate 
the impact of succession on firm future performance. In 
relation to that, the departure of a well-respected CEO/MD 
may represent a loss of managerial talent to the company 
(Dahyaa, Lonie & Power 2000), thus affecting the firm’s 
share price negatively. Meanwhile, the appointment of 
successor with desirable characteristics may give positive 
impact to the share price (Nguyen, Hagendorff & Eshraghi 
2015). There are previous studies (e.g. Fanelli & Grasselli 
2006; Tosi, Misangyi, Fanelli, Waldman & Yammarino 
2004; Waldman, Ramirez, House & Puranam 2001), 
which provided evidence that CEO’s charisma affects the 
perceptions of external stakeholders and share prices. 
However, as reported by Dahyaa et al. (2000), relatively 
small or insignificant share price response was observed 
in earlier studies (such as Ishak & Abdul Latif 2012; 
Setiawan et al. 2011; Cools & van Praag 2007; Warner, 
Watts & Wruck 1988), whereby this situation is due to 
investors’ uncertainty of whether the performance of the 
“new” management is better than its predecessor (Dahyaa 
et al. 2000). 
 Therefore, researcher redirected their attention 
from the capital market perspective to the accounting 
performance perspective to capture the effect of succession 
in a longer period of time, which is based on year-end 
accounting period. Accounting perspective has two 
types of studies – (i) to examine various accounting and 
financial measures surrounding CEO/MD succession and 
(ii) to estimate firm performance consequences of CEO/
MD succession. Studies which investigate the behavior of 
accounting variables indicate only discretionary accounting 
variables (e.g. R&D expenditures, capital expenditures & 
accounting accruals) influenced by CEO/MD succession 
as it is subjected to managerial consideration (Murphy & 
Zimmerman 1993). On the other hand, firm performance 
due to CEO/MD is commonly measured by performance 
indicators such as Tobin-Q, return on assets (ROA); return 
on shareholder’s equity (ROE), total assets and total sales 
(Lindrianasari & Hartono 2012; Karaevli 2007; Rhim 
et al. 2006; Shen & Cannella 2002). However, previous 
studies have shown mixed results regarding the impact 
of CEO successions on firms’ subsequent performance 
(Ishak, Ku Ismail & Abdullah 2013; Karaevli 2007). 
Thus, inconclusive findings had been derived of whether 
succession benefits or disrupts firm performance. Therefore 
this has motivated us to examine the effect of CEO/MD 
succession on the share price over a longer window period 
of observation, rather than daily or monthly performance, 
as suggested by Karaevli (2007). Unlike the above studies, 
the current study examines the effect of CEO/MD succession 
on the value relevance of accounting numbers reported by 
Malaysian firms. 
 We acknowledge that studies on CEO/MD succession 
are still limited in Malaysia despite fact that research 
studies in this area have been around for more than 40 years 
(Bornemann, Kick, Pfingsten & Schertler 2015; Ferris, 
Jayaraman & Lim 2015). Hence, this current study extends 
the limited literature on CEO/MD succession in Malaysian 
context. Prior studies by Ishak and Abdul Latif (2012) 
and Rosli (2012) examined capital market performance 
perspective using event-study methodology to examine 
the effect of changes in top management on share price. 
Other study by Ishak et al. (2013) investigated the effects of 
succession on firm performance by using ROA and Tobin-Q 
to evaluate whether the CEO succession improves, disrupts 
or has no effect on the firm’s post-performance. 
 Our current study, however, attempts to incorporate 
CEO/MD succession and firm value, which represented by 
firm’s share price four month after closing of financial 
year-end. We propose that in real situation, investor might 
use financial statement information to reflect the benefit 
of CEO/MD succession to the firm performance. In other 
words, investors are only able to evaluate new CEO/MD 
performance after the accounting information has been 
released. Thus, we incorporate value relevance model to 
examine whether CEO/MD succession regarded as useful 
information by investors, which will be reflected in the 
share price of the firm. 
 In terms of value relevance, previous studies showed 
that changes in the accounting standards (Chebaane & 
Othman 2014; Agostino, Drago & Silipo 2011; Clarkson, 
Hanna, Richardson & Thompson 2011; Kadri, Abdul 
Aziz & Ibrahim 2009; Goodwin, Ahmed & Heaney 2008; 
Bartov, Goldberg & Kim 2005); type of industry (Tan, 
Hassan & Embong 2014; El-Gazzar, Finn & Tang 2009; 
Nwaeze 1998) and corporate governance of the firm 
(Cormier 2014; Jamaluddin, Mastuki & Elmiza Ahmad 
2009; Cools & van Praag 2007; Davis-Friday, Eng & Liu 
2006) influence value relevance of accounting numbers 
(book value of equity & earnings). However, none of these 
studies examined the role of incoming CEOs/MDs on the 
value relevance of accounting numbers. 
 According to Habib and Hossain (2013), new CEOs/
MDs acknowledge the importance of financial statements 
information as a platform which allows an outsider to 
evaluate their efficiency in maximizing shareholder value. 
Therefore, we believe, they are motivated to influence 
managers in reporting the accounting information. Hence, 
this study will investigate whether changes in CEO/MD have 
a moderating effect towards value relevance of accounting 
numbers. Additionally, this study will also investigate 
whether the origin of the incoming CEO/MD (i.e. whether 
he/she is from inside or outside of organization) influences 
the value relevance of accounting numbers. In the context 
of value relevance study, the reliability of accounting 
numbers depends on the successors’ characteristics as they 
might influence top management decision in the reporting 
of financial statements. 
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 This study’s sample is consisting of 95 companies 
which made 105 CEO/MD announcements during the period 
of 2008 – 2014. For each company, we collected accounting 
data and financial data (share price) for 7-year period. 
However, data available for regression analysis is only 
584 firm-years; derived after we excluded missing data and 
extreme value from the data set. Our findings indicate that 
accounting numbers (book value of equity and earnings per 
share) are value relevant. We also provide evidence that 
the appointment of new CEO/MD is only value relevant in 
a longer period of time after the succession. Additionally, 
the study shows that investors in Malaysia regard earnings 
as value relevant if the new top management is from inside 
the organization itself. 
 This study contributes to prior literature by 
incorporating CEO/MD succession into value relevance 
study in order to examine the effects of succession from 
the investors’ perspective. To the best of our knowledge, 
this is the first study which combines CEO/MD succession 
and value relevance. Findings in this study may offer 
implication towards strategic decision making in corporate 
management of public listed companies in Malaysia, 
specifically when board of directors are considering the 
replacement of CEO/MD. The remainder of this paper is 
organized as follows. Section two discusses literature 
review and hypotheses development. This is followed by 
the research methodology and research findings. Finally 
section five concludes this article. 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
THE EFFECT OF CEO/MD SUCCESSION ON THE SHARE PRICE
The effect of managerial succession on firm performance 
remains a debate in spite of increasing number of studies 
and renewed attention to this problem (Ishak & Abdul 
Latif 2012). According to Rhim et al. (2006), research on 
CEO succession is generally focused on three elements; 
the antecedents of succession, the origin of the successor, 
and the consequences of succession. Most of prior studies 
focused on the consequences of succession, i.e. either on 
market reactions that are reflected in changes of share 
prices, or financial and accounting performance of the firm 
at the end of financial year. An event study methodology is 
commonly used to evaluate investors’ immediate reactions 
towards the announcement of top management succession 
(Cheung & Jackson 2012; Dherment-Ferere & Renneboog 
2000; Ishak & Abdul Latif 2012; Rosli 2012; Setiawan 
et al. 2011; Charitou, Patis & Vlittis 2010; Dahyaa et al. 
2000). 
 In the event study approach, share price movement 
is observed in determining whether CEO/MD succession 
announcements have information content that influences 
investors’ decision making (Setiawan et al. 2011). 
However, literature provides mixed findings as most 
studies indicated positive market reaction (Setiawan 2008; 
Dahya & McConnell 2005; Huson et al. 2004; Kang & 
Shivdasani 1996; Denis & Denis 1995; Weisbach 1988), 
while other studies (Ishak & Abdul Latif 2012; Dedman 
& Lin 2002; Warner et al. 1988) reported negative market 
reaction toward firms’ share prices. These inconsistent 
results could be influenced by how investors’ perceived 
the incoming CEO/MD. 
 The appointment of new CEO may lead to a positive 
market reaction if the new CEO has new vision and strong 
aspiration to achieve better performance (Smith 2011); new 
leadership style (Kang & Shivdasani 1996) and implement 
new strategies and policies (Pessarossi & Weill 2013). 
Smooth top management succession processes may also 
lead to positive reaction from the investors as it reduces 
the uncertainty of firm operation and businesses (Setiawan 
2008; Rhim et al. 2006; Friedman & Singh 1989). For firms 
with poor financial performance, the replacement of CEO/
MD will send a positive signal to the market (Ishak & Abdul 
Latif 2012) as it may reflect the firm’s intention to initiate 
strategic change (Shen & Cannella 2002). Therefore, 
the appointment is perceived as good news because new 
CEO/MD is expected to improve the firm’s performance 
(Lindrianasari & Hartono 2012; Setiawan et al. 2011; Rhim 
et al. 2006). 
 As previously discussed, event study methodology 
approach focuses on an immediate changes on share 
prices due to top management changes. Therefore, only 
limited time frame (window period) has been observed. 
However, the succession may have an impact on the share 
prices beyond the window period. As firm performance 
is used as an indicator to monitor the performance of the 
top executive (Pourciau 1993), we predict that investors 
may use financial statement to evaluate the new CEO/MD’s 
capabilities. This is because the information in financial 
statements allows investors to gauge how efficient the CEO 
is in fulfilling the expectation (Habib & Hossain 2013). 
CEO/MD succession may have useful information content 
to the investors that is reflected in the share prices when 
investors value firm future prospect at the end of fiscal 
year. Thus, our hypothesis 1 is: 
H1: CEO/MD succession is associated with share price.
CEO/MD SUCCESSION AND VALUE RELEVANCE OF 
ACCOUNTING NUMBERS
Most value relevance studies assume that investors depend 
on information in financial statements as their primary 
references in making investment decisions (Holthausen 
& Watts 2001; Barth 2000; Lambert 1996). Financial 
statements present the economic events of a business entity 
which occurred during the reporting period, and therefore 
the information should be value relevant to the investors 
(Hassan & Mohd-Saleh 2010). The usefulness of the 
accounting information to the investors has been shown 
through their reactions that are reflected in share prices. 
Thus, if the statistical relationship between accounting 
information and the share prices is positive and significant, 
then the information is said to be value relevant (Hassan, 
Mohd Saleh, Fuad Rahman & Abdul Shukor 2012). 
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 The Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) developed 
by Fama (1970) is relevant in explaining the effect of 
accounting numbers on share price. Fama (1970) classified 
EMH into 3 different types: (1) weak form market efficiency 
(in which the information set is just historical prices); (2) 
semi-strong form efficiency (the share prices reflect all 
information that is publicly available); and (3) strong form 
efficiency (the share prices reflect all information known 
to anyone at the point in time both publicly available 
and private information). Prior studies within Malaysian 
context indicated that the equity market of Malaysia is of 
a semi-strong market efficient (Tan et al. 2014; Hussin, 
Ahmed & Ying 2010; Tuck 2005; Isa & Yap 2004). This is 
because research found that the share prices of firms listed 
in Bursa Malaysia reacted quickly to all publicly available 
information (Tan et al. 2014; Goh, Hassan & Mohd Nor 
2008). Annual report is one of the public information that 
released by a firm. Therefore any information disclosed in 
the annual report is expected to be reflected in the share 
price, should the information is deemed useful by the 
investors (Tan et al. 2014). 
 Most literature on the value relevance of accounting 
information had comprehensively documented the 
association between accounting numbers (i.e. earnings and 
book values) and share prices (Gulhan 2012). Nevertheless, 
this does not limit researchers from exploring other 
factors that might affect the value relevance of accounting 
numbers. This is because the Ohlson Model (Ohlson 1995) 
(which is the most prevalent model used in prior value 
relevance studies), does not provide sufficient explanation 
of why accounting numbers are associated with firm’s share 
prices. Therefore, many prior researchers have started to 
examine specific conditions or factors that can influence 
the relationship between accounting numbers and share 
price. These include the studies on the effects of accounting 
standard and regulation in specific industries (Chebaane & 
Othman 2014; Gulhan 2012; Agostino et al. 2011; Horton 
& Serafeim 2010; Kadri et al. 2009; Goodwin et al. 2008; 
Lin & Chen 2005; Bartov et al. 2005) and corporate 
governance (Cormier 2014; Jamaluddin et al. 2009; Cools 
& van Praag 2007; Davis-Friday et al. 2006). 
 In relation to corporate governance (Cormier 2014; 
Jamaluddin et al. 2009; Cools & van Praag 2007; Davis-
Friday et al. 2006); provided evidences that good (bad) 
corporate governance practices may strengthen (weaken) 
the value relevance of accounting numbers. The studies 
incorporated three factors, namely information asymmetry 
(Cormier 2014); quality of financial reporting (Jamaluddin 
et al. 2009) and interactions across governance mechanisms 
(Davis-Friday et al. 2006). While some researchers 
examined corporate governance mechanisms as a whole, 
there are studies that focused on a particular governance 
mechanism. Studies by Tan et al. (2014) and Cools and 
Van Praag (2007) examined the role of board, as one of 
the mechanisms of corporate governance, in influencing 
investor’s confidence over accounting numbers. 
 Besides the above, top management, especially CEO is 
also considered as an important governance mechanism. 
According to Fortune, CEO ‘exert enormous influence 
over entire enterprises’ (Fanelli & Grasselli 2006). CEO 
plays a major role in managing and ensuring the business 
operations (Amran et al. 2014) and leads a firm to compete 
in the market (Setiawan et al. 2011). This is consistent with 
Wu, Quan and Xu (2011) which indicated CEO decision-
making power has obvious significant effects on firms’ 
operations. The role of CEO is becoming more prevalent 
during succession period. CEO turnover is considered as 
a critical and significant event to the firm (Rosli 2012; 
Rhim et al. 2006; Clayton, Hartzel & Rosenberg 2000). 
Both internal and external constituents are likely to view 
succession as an indication of the firm’s future (Rhim et al. 
2006); this is because firms are expected to perform better 
after the new appointment. 
 In terms of financial reporting, a CEO is responsible 
for the content, accuracy and completeness of financial 
disclosures as he or she is considered as a gatekeeper of 
financial information to be released (Donoher et al. 2007; 
Rezaee 2003). CEO can influence the Chief Financial Officer 
(CFO) to be in line with the boards’ goals (i.e., encouraging 
the production of precise and accurate information) or can 
force CFO to manipulate outputs from the reporting system 
and overstate performance (Friedman 2014). Hence, the 
quality of accounting information disclosed in the annual 
report can directly be associated with the CEO or new CEO. 
The CEOs/MDs may signal their managerial ability to the 
shareholders by achieving certain earnings benchmarks 
during the first full year as a CEO/MD of the firm. Based on 
prospect theory, we predict that investors have a tendency 
to react positively if a firm reports an increased earnings 
rather than losses or decrease in earnings. This effect may 
become more prevalent if firm is already experiencing 
poor financial performance preceding to the appointment 
of the new CEO/MD. Therefore our second hypothesis is:
H2: CEO/MD succession affects the value relevance of book 
value of equity and earnings.
ORIGIN OF SUCCESSOR
Research on CEO/MD succession has also documented 
the origin of successor as one of the important factors 
that affects investors’ reactions toward CEO turnover 
announcements (Setiawan et al. 2011) and firm post-
succession performance (Shen & Cannella 2002). 
Typically, there are two types of successor – insider and 
outsider. Insider is an executive promoted from within the 
firm, while outsider is appointed to the CEO position from 
other organization (Shen & Cannella 2002). 
 It is a well-established empirical fact that in the 
majority of CEO turnovers, the successor is a company 
insider (Ferris et al. 2015; Pessarossi & Weill 2013; Kind 
& Schläpfer 2010). This is based on insider qualities in 
terms of specific knowledge about the firm’s operations 
and social network to acquire internal information 
(Dherment-Ferere & Renneboog 2000). Besides, insider 
provides consistency and stability to the organization; 
thus, ensuring the succession process seamless as possible 
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(Rhim et al. 2006). However, firms do typically appoint 
outside successors if they face the pressure of initiating 
strategic change (Shen & Cannella 2002) or firms are in 
situations of poor organizational performance, financial 
distress or bankruptcy (Setiawan et al. 2011; Rhim et al. 
2006). In these situations, literature suggests that firms 
do not believe that an inside successor can bring the 
desired change; instead, they view outside successor as 
a catalyst of change that will hopefully lead to improved 
firm performance (Jalal & Prezas 2012). 
 In terms of financial performance, literature provides 
mixed findings of who has better performance, insider or 
outsider. Researchers such as Ferris et al. (2015), Rhim et 
al. (2006) and Kesner and Sebora (1994), linked insider 
with better post-succession performance. This can be 
associated with pre-succession performance whereby 
large firms (with stable financial performance) are 
always electing inside candidates as their new CEOs/MDs 
(Dherment-Ferere & Renneboog 2000). Thus, the financial 
performance of post-succession will be better than the pre-
succession period. However, in Malaysian context, Ishak et 
al. (2013) indicated that outsider is better in terms of post-
succession performance. In this case the outside successor 
can be seen able to promote the external knowledge to 
his/her new company (Georgakakis & Ruigrok 2016). 
Using a multilevel framework, Georgakakis and Ruigrok 
(2016) indicated that the outside successor, which share 
common socio-demography attributes with executives and 
has a variety of industrial and international experience are 
positively related with firm performance. In addition to 
that they also provide a contradictory finding to Dherment-
Ferere and Renneboog (2000) where outside succession 
also associated with well-performing firms. We, therefore, 
predict that the perception toward the ability of successor 
to bring better performance to the firm may have an impact 
on investor’s perception. Hence, the third hypothesis is:
H3: Origin of the successor (from inside or outside) affects 
the value relevance of book value of equity and earnings
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
DATA SOURCE
This study used secondary data to collect information 
about CEO/MD succession obtained from the Company 
Announcements section published in the Bursa Malaysia’s 
website (www.bursamalaysia.com). Accounting data (book 
value of equity and earnings) and financial data (share 
price) were extracted from Thomson Financial DataStream. 
Missing data were manually collected from annual reports 
published in the official website of Bursa Malaysia or 
companies’ websites.
SAMPLE SELECTION
This study selects 250 firms with largest market 
capitalization as at 31 December 2014 as sample of this 
study. We then reviewed all announcements made by these 
250 companies under Company Announcements section, 
specifically in two sub-categories, “Change in Board 
Room” and “Change in CEO” to yield at least 100 cases 
of CEO/MD succession. These two sections disclosed all 
announcements related to changes in board of directors, 
chairman and other top management position.
 We had identified 105 announcements made by 95 
companies during the period of study. This represents 
38% of 250 sample companies. This percentage of CEO/
MD succession in Malaysia for seven years period is 
predicted as top executive turnover is relatively a rare 
event (Pourciau 1993). The announcements also contain 
information related to date of resignation/appointment, 
reason for change, the origin of successor (from inside 
or outside of the organization), qualification and working 
experience. Table 1 summarizes the characteristics of the 
announcement and type of the industry. Panel A, Table 1 
indicates that 63.8% of the successors are from within the 
organization itself. The highest number of succession was 
recorded in 2013 (24 announcements) and the lowest was 
reported in 2014 (9 announcements). Panel B indicates that 
30 (31.6%) of the companies are from trading and services 
industry.
 Second, we then collected accounting data (book 
value of equity per share and earnings per share) and 
financial data (share price) for the period between 2008 
and 2014. Additional accounting data for year 2007 were 
collected for all companies which succession occurred in 
2008. This allows us to compare share price performance 
before and after CEO/MD succession. This process yielded 
680 firm-years data. However, we excluded 4 firm-years 
due to missing data or data not available in the database/
company website, 61 firm-years data due to extreme value 
and 31 firm-years data due to negative earnings per share. 
Therefore, the final observations are 584 firm-years. Table 
2 presents a summary of observation for the study.
MEASUREMENT OF VARIABLES
Consistent with prior value relevance studies (Hassan et al. 
2012; Hassan & Mohd-Saleh 2010; Jamaluddin et al. 2009; 
Kadri et al. 2009), the current study utilizes the Ohlson 
(1995) model. Thus, our dependent variable is firm value, 
which is measured based on the firm’s share price in the 
fourth month following the closing date of fiscal year. This 
is consistent with the practice that the audited financial 
statements will only be available within a period of four 
months after the closing date (Tan et al. 2014). 
 Based on Ohlson (1995), our independent variables 
are book value of equity per share and earnings per 
share. According to Barth and Clinch (2009), the results 
obtained using variables on a per share basis provide the 
most unbiased estimates. As we aimed to examine the 
role of CEO/MD turnover, a dummy variable is introduced 
(1, if the company experiences CEO/MD turnover, or 0, if 
otherwise). We classified the origin of successor either as 
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an insider or outsider based on the information disclosed 
in the company announcements section. Consistent 
with Huson et al. (2004) and Setiawan et al. (2011), we 
considered the successor as an insider if the person has 
been working in the company for at least one year, or has 
a family relationship with the outgoing CEO/MD. Else, the 
successor is considered as an outsider. The summary of 
variables and the measurements is shown in Table 3.
 We categorized our period of study into: i) transition 
year (t0) - the fiscal year in which the CEO changes, ii) 
preceding year (t-1) - the year preceding the transition 
year (Murphy & Zimmerman 1993) and iii) post transition 
(t+1) - the year after the transition year. We then divided 
post transition period into two categories; in which TMC_1 
indicates a post transition year, while TMC_C indicates post 
transition years under the stewardship of new CEO/MD. 
Figure 1 presents the categorization of the time frame for 
this study.
MULTIPLE REGRESSION MODEL
The Ohlson’s valuation model (Ohlson 1995) is widely 
used in value relevance studies. This model provides a 
direct link between accounting numbers and firm value 
which is absent from other models (Barth 2000). The 
value of firm’s equity can be expressed as a function of its 
earnings and book value of equity (Beisland 2009; Ohlson 
1995). Thus, share prices are regressed on both earnings 
TABLE 1. Number of CEO/MD announcement, number of company, 
type of industry and origin of the successor
Panel A: Number of CEO/MD announcement and origin of the successor
Year
Number of 
announcement
Origin of Successor
Inside Outside
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
15
11
16
12
18
24
9
8
8
9
10
11
17
4
7
3
7
2
7
7
5
Total 1051
67 
(63.8%)
38
(36.2%)
Panel B: Type of industry and number of company
Type of industry Number of company %
Trading & services
Industrial products
Properties
Consumer products
Finance
Plantation
REIT
Construction
Infrastructure Project Companies
30
15
13
10
10
6
5
4
2
31.6
15.8
13.7
10.5
10.5
6.3
5.3
4.2
2.1
Total 95 100
TABLE 2. Summary of sample for the study
Number of 
company
Number of observation 
(firm year)
Sample of company
Announcement of CEO/MD succession
Add: Companies which succession 
occurred in 2008 listed in 2007
Deduct:
 Missing or unavailable data 
 Extreme data
 Negative earnings per share
250
95
15
665
15
(4)
(61)
(31)
Final observation 584
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and book value of equity to measure how accounting 
numbers affects market value of equity as represented by 
share price of the firm. The basic equation of Ohlson (1995) 
model is shown in Equation (1).
 SPit = α0 + α1BEit α2EPSit + εit  (1)
where:
SP = share price measured four months following the 
financial year for firm i for year t
BE = book value of equity per share for firm i for year t
EPS = earnings per share for firm i for year t
ε = error term
 We then extended Equation (1) to incorporate the 
effect of newly appointed CEO/MD on the share price. To do 
this, we introduced a dummy variable to represent firm with 
and without succession. A nominal value 1 is allocated for 
a firm with CEO/MD succession, or 0 if otherwise. Hence, 
Equations (2), (2a) and (2b) are stated as follows:
 SPit = α0+ α1 BEit + α2 EPSit + α3 TMCit (2)
 SPit = α0 + α1 BEit + α2 EPSit + α3 TMC_1it (2a)
 SPit = α0 + α1 BEit + α2 EPSit + α3 TMC_Cit  (2b)
where:
TMC = Dummy variable 1 indicates transition year of 
CEO/MD succession (the occurrence year of CEO/
MD succession), or 0 for otherwise
TMC_1 = Dummy variable 1 indicates a post transition 
year of CEO/MD succession, or 0 for otherwise
TMC_C = Dummy variable 1 indicates post transition 
years of CEO/MD succession, or 0 for otherwise
Other variables are as defined in Equation (1)
 We extended Equation (2) to incorporate the effect 
of CEO/MD succession on the relationship between share 
price and accounting numbers. Thus, we included the 
interaction between CEO/MD succession and book value of 
equity; and the interaction between CEO/MD succession and 
earnings per share. These interactions are incorporated into 
Equations (3), (3a) and 3(b). The equations are as follows:
 SPit = α0 + α1 BEit + α2 EPSit + α3 TMCit + 
  α
4
 CBEit + α5 CEPSit + εit (3)
 SPit = α0 + α1BEit + α2 EPSit + α3TMC_1it + 
  α
4
CBE1it + α5CEPS1it + εit  (3a)
  SPit = α0 + α1 BEit + α2 EPSit + α3 TMC_Cit +
  α
4
 CBE2it + α5 CEPS2it + εit (3b)
TABLE 3.Variables and measurements
Variable Definition Measurement
SP Share price Price of share four months after closing date of 
financial year
BE Book value of equity per share Book value of net assets deflated by outstanding 
share
EPS Earnings per share Earnings for year available to firm’s common 
shareholders deflated by outstanding share
TMC The occurrence of CEO/MD succession Dummy variable 1 indicates transition year of 
CEO/MD succession (the occurrence year of CEO/
MD succession), or 0 for otherwise
(the year where the succession occur 
- transition year)
TMC_1 The first year after the occurrence of 
CEO/MD succession
Dummy variable 1 indicates a post transition year 
of CEO/MD succession (a year after the transition 
year), or 0 for otherwise
TMC_C The post transition years after the 
occurrence of CEO/MD succession
Dummy variable 1 indicates post transition years 
of CEO/MD succession, or 0 for otherwise
FIGURE 1. Categorization of time frame of the study
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where:
CBE/CBE1/CBE2 = Interaction between TMC/TMC_1/
TMC_C and BE
CEPS/CEPS1/CEPS2 = Interaction between TMC/TMC_1/
TMC_C and EPS
Other variables are as defined in Equations (1) and (2).
 We then modified Equations (3), (3a) and (3b) to 
evaluate the origin of the successor (whether he/she is 
insider or outsider) as the origin of incoming CEO/MD 
might influence firm post-performance as well as inventors’ 
confidence. In order to investigate how this factor affects 
the relationship between share price and accounting 
numbers, we replaced variable for top management change 
(TMC, TMC_1 and TMC_C) with new variable which indicates 
the origin of successor. The new variables that indicate 
outside successor are TMCO, TMCO_1 and TMCO_C, and 
inside successor are TMCI, TMCI_1 and TMCI_C respectively. 
Hence, the new equations are stated as follows: 
 SPit = α0 + α1 BEit + α2 EPSit + α3 TMCOit + 
   α
4
 CBE_Oit + α5 CEPS_Oit + εit (4)
 SPit = α0 + α1 BEit + α2 EPSit + α3 TMCO_1it + 
   α
4
CBE1_Oit + α5 CEPS1_Oit + εit  (4a)
 SPit = α0 + α1 BEit + α2 EPSit + α3 TMCO_Cit + 
   α
4
 CBE2_Oit + α5 CEPS2_Oit + εit (4b)
where:
TMCI = Dummy variable 1 indicates transition 
year of CEO/MD succession with outside 
successor, or 0 for otherwise
TMCO_1 = Dummy variable 1 indicates a post 
transition year of CEO/MD succession with 
outside successor, or 0 for otherwise
TMCO_C = Dummy variable 1 indicates post transition 
years of CEO/MD succession with outside 
successor, or 0 for otherwise
CBE_O/CBE1_O/CBE2_O = Interaction between TMCO/
TMCO_1 & TMCO_C and BE
CEPS_O/CEPS1_O/CEPS2_O = Interaction between TMCO, 
TMCO_1 & TMCO_C and EPS
Other variables are as defined in Equation (1).
 SPit = α0 + α1 BEit + α2 EPSit + α3 TMCIit + 
   α
4
 CBE_Iit + α5 CEPS_Iit + εit  (5)
 SPit = α0 + α1 BEit + α2 EPSit + α3 TMCI_1it + 
   α
4
 CBE1_Iit + α5 CEPS1_Iit + εit  (5a)
 SPit = α0 + α1 BEit + α2 EPSit + α3 TMCI_Cit + 
   α
4 
CBE2_Iit + α5 CEPS2_Iit + εit (5b)
where:
TMCI = Dummy variable 1 indicates transition year 
of CEO/MD succession with inside successor, 
or 0 for otherwise
TMCI_1 = Dummy variable 1 indicates a post transition 
year of CEO/MD succession with inside 
successor, or 0 for otherwise
TMCI_C = Dummy variable 1 indicates post transition 
years of CEO/MD succession with inside 
successor, or 0 for otherwise
CBE_I/CBE1_I/CBE2_I = Interaction between TMCI, 
TMCI_1 & TMCI_C and BE
CEPS_I/CEPS1_I/CEPS2_I = Interaction between TMCI, 
TMCI_1 & TMCI_C and EPS
Other variables are as defined in Equation (1).
RESULTS
DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS
Table 4 presents the descriptive statistic for the total 
584 firm-years sample. This table shows mean, median, 
minimum and maximum value and standard deviation for 
all the dependent and independent variables. The mean 
for share price is RM3.4628 with a standard deviation of 
3.1062. The minimum and maximum values of share price 
are at RM0.1100 and RM18.1400, respectively. 
 Table 5 presents the average share prices during 
4 period of time, t–1, which indicates the year prior the 
transition year, t0 (a transition year), t+1 (a year after the 
transition year) and t+2 (two-year after the transition 
year). Column 3, Table 5 indicates inconsistent results 
for the average share price reported in the transition 
year. Except for 2008, 2011 and 2014, the average share 
prices are higher than the share price reported before 
the CEO/MD succession (t–1). The inconsistent findings 
are consistent with our understanding that the effect of 
succession during the transition period is ambiguous 
to the investors. This is because they may not able to 
associate the performance of the companies with the 
appropriate CEO/MD. This is because both outgoing and 
incoming are likely to have had a substantial impact on 
the transition year’s operation (Murphy & Zimmerman 
1993). Nevertheless the effect of succession over a longer 
period of time might be different. 
 Columns 4 and 5, Table 5 indicate in average, there 
is an increase in share price during the post transition 
periods (t+1 and t+2). Except for year 2013 (t+1), the 
average share price for the post transition is higher than 
the share price during transition year (t0). However, the 
share prices for t+1 and t+2 are higher than the t–1. This 
could be associated with changes of CEO/MD. The next 
section will explain this issue further.
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CORRELATIONS TEST
Table 6 presents correlation matrix for all variables. The 
findings indicate that earnings per share and book value of 
equity are significantly and positively correlated with the 
share price at (0.7361) and (0.6755) respectively. These 
findings indicate that book value of equity and earnings 
per share are value relevance of accounting information 
(Jamaluddin et al. 2009). At the same time, book value 
of equity and earnings per share are significantly and 
positively correlated with each other (0.7093). However, 
multicollinearity is unlikely to be a problem since the 
correlation between these two independent variables is 
less than 0.8 (Kennedy 2003).
 Table 6 also indicates that TMC and TMC_1 are not 
significantly correlated with the share price. However, 
TMC_C (0.1253) are significantly and positively correlated 
with the share price at p<0.01 level. This finding can be 
interpreted as CEO/MD succession does not influence the 
investors in their decision making in a short period of time 
(the transition year and a year after the transition year). 
However, over a longer period of time, CEO/MD succession 
does influence the share price. This indicates that investors 
may take some time to value the quality and capabilities 
of the new CEO/MD. This is consistent with our findings 
presented in Table 5. 
MULTIPLE REGRESSION RESULTS
Table 7 presents multiple regression results on the value 
relevance of book value, earnings and CEO/MD succession 
(Equations 1, 2 and 3). The regression analyses were 
performed on 584 observations based on the White’s 
heteroscedasticity-correction. Column 2 Table 7 presents 
result for Equation (1) which indicated both accounting 
numbers [i.e. book value of equity per share (BE) and 
earnings per share (EPS)] are value relevant. Both variables, 
BE and EPS, are positively related to share price at p < 0.01. 
These findings are consistent with prior studies (Gulhan 
2012; Goh et al. 2008; Jamaluddin et al. 2009; Kadri et al. 
2009; Graham & King 2000).
TABLE 5. Average Share Price before and after the Succession (n=584)
Transition year
Share Prices 
t–1 t0 t+1 t+2
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2.2096
2.6706
3.7459
3.2540
2.5697
3.6298
3.7771
1.7383
3.4122
3.9599
3.1422
2.8306
4.3997
3.7705
2.4071
4.0656
4.0814
3.4039
3.2605
4.3705
NIL
2.9884
4.1642
5.3201
3.6989
3.2303
NIL
NIL 
Where: t-1 = the year preceding the transition year; t0 = transition year (fiscal year in which the CEO changes); t+1 = post transition year (a year after 
the transition year); t+2 = post transition year (2 - year after the transition year). NIL indicates unavailable share price information for year 2016 and 
2017. This is because the study takes share price four month following the closing of each financial year, which in this case, for transition year 2013, 
t+2 indicates financial year 2015 (which requires share price 2016) and for transition year 2014 t+1 indicates financial year 2015 (which requires share 
price 2016) and t+2 indicates financial year 2016 (which requires share price 2017).
TABLE 4. Descriptive Statistics (n=584)
SP EPS BE TMC TMC_1 TMC_C
 Mean  3.46
28
0.268
7
 2.18
51
 0.155
8
 0.14
73
 0.496
6
 Median  2.40
50
0.198
0
 1.73
90
 0.000
0
 0.00
00
 0.000
0
 Maximum 18.14
00
 1.194
0
 8.07
80
 1.000
0
 1.00
00
 1.000
0
 Minimum 0.110
0
0.001
0
0.034
0
 0.000
0
 0.00
00
 0.000
0
 Std. Dev.  3.10
62
 0.227
5
 1.61
33
 0.363
0
 0.35
47
 0.500
4
 Skewness 1.77
73
1.437
8
1.403
4
1.897
9
1.99
08
0.0137
 Kurtosis  6.56
80
 4.950
7
 4.78
62
 4.602
2
 4.96
34
 1.000
2 
SP = share price at four month after financial year end. EPS = earnings per share, BE = book value equity per share, TMC = Dummy variable 1 indicates 
the occurrence of CEO/MD succession (transition year of CEO/MD succession), or 0 for otherwise, TMC_1 = Dummy variable 1 indicates a post transition 
year of CEO/MD succession, or 0 for otherwise, and TMC_C = Dummy variable 1 indicates post transition years of CEO/MD succession, or 0 for otherwise.
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 The purpose of H1 is to examine the effect of CEO/
MD succession on firm’s share price. Thus, we extended 
Equation 1 to incorporate dummy variable 1 which 
indicates the occurrence of CEO/MD succession in the firm, 
or 0 if otherwise. We estimated the share price, book value 
of equity per share, earnings per share, and the occurrence 
of CEO/MD succession (Equation 2). Column 3 indicates 
that while BE and EPS have significant relationship with 
share price, the appointment of new CEO/MD on the 
transition year (TMC) is not significantly related to share 
price. The insignificant relationship can be due to the fact 
that the investors cannot make an assessment on the new 
CEO/MD’s performance during the transition year. 
 We extended Equation 2 to Equation 2a (column 
5) and Equation 2b (column 7) to present our findings 
about the appointment of new CEO/MD for the first 12 
months period and 3-year period. The results from these 
analyses may provide evidence of how time-factor will 
affect investors’ consideration of newly appointed CEO/
MD. Similar to previous findings, we found that incoming 
CEO/MD does not have useful information content during 
their first full year as a CEO/MD (TMC_1). These findings 
can be interpreted as, in a short period of time (TMC and 
TMC_1), CEO/MD succession does not influence investors 
in their decision making as investors might not be able to 
objectively evaluate the incoming CEO/MD performance. 
The findings also support the scapegoating view which 
considers CEO/MD removal as a form of scapegoating 
and new manager is not responsible for firm’s immediate 
performance (Ishak et al. 2013; Huson et al. 2004). In this 
case, investors might not consider CEO/MD succession as 
a solution that could alter firm performance, thus market 
perceived CEO turnover as not having useful information 
content (Dherment-Ferere & Renneboog 2000). 
 However, our findings indicate that the CEO/MD 
succession is significantly related to share prices in a longer 
period of time (post transition years) as TMC_C is positive 
and significantly related to share price. This indicates that 
investors do value succession as relevant in determining the 
share price of the firm, i.e. TMC_C has useful information 
content to the investors in decision making. 
 From the above results, we can conclude that investors 
may need some time to evaluate the abilities of the newly 
appointed CEO/MD in managing and bringing better 
performance to the firm because improvements by new 
CEO/MD may not be visible in a short period of time. This is 
because the new CEO may need to take some time to align 
his/her vision and strategy; and therefore improvements 
and profitability can only be realized at least two years 
after the transition year (Ishak et al. 2013; Dahyaa et al. 
2000). The insignificance of TMC and TMC_1 might be due 
to the increase in the information asymmetry during the 
transition period (TMC) and a period after TMC (TMC_1). The 
new CEO/MD may have the intention to reduce the level of 
available information (Sohn, Oh, Kang & Bae 2014) as 
the real performance, which is based on the new policies 
(introduced by the incoming successor), would not become 
evident in a short period of time. Thus, we tend to conclude 
that H1 is supported only when the occurrence of newly 
appointed CEO/MD are considered over a longer period of 
time (TMC_C). Moreover, these findings also support our 
early prediction that CEO/MD succession has an implication 
on market performance beyond a short window period. 
 We believe that CEO/MD or new CEO/MD plays a role 
in influencing the quality of accounting report, as they 
might have the ability to influence the managers or Chief 
Financial Officer (CFO) to meet their objectives (Habib & 
Hossain, 2013). Therefore, we analyze the effect of top 
management change on the value relevance of accounting 
numbers. Column 4, (Equation 3), column 6 (Equation 
3a) and column 8 (Equation 3b), Table 7 present the 
regression analyses on the effect of interaction between 
the occurrences of CEO/MD succession and book value of 
equity per share and earnings per share to share price. 
 The findings indicate that book value of equity per 
share and earnings per share are significantly related to 
share price at p < 0.01. These results are consistent at each 
point of time (TMC, TMC_1 and TMC_C); thus, we strengthen 
existing literature which concluded that earnings and book 
value of equity are useful accounting information for the 
investors. 
 However, when interaction was considered, we found 
that interactions between TMC and TMC_1 with book value 
of equity per share (CBE and CBE1) and earnings per share 
(CEPS and CEPS1) are not significantly related to share price. 
It is believed that incoming CEO/MD may significantly 
TABLE 6. Pearson Correlation Matrix (n=584) 
Variables SP EPS BE TMC TMC_1 TMC_C
SP 
EPS 
BE 
TMC 
TMC_1 
TMC_C 
1.0000
0.7361*
0.6755*
0.0016
0.0525
0.1253*
1.0000
0.7093*
 -0.0267
0.0232
0.0361
1.0000
0.0086
0.0326
0.0645
1.0000
-0.1785*
0.4326*
1.0000
0.4184* 1.0000
Note: * significant at p<0.01 
SP = share price at four month after financial year end. EPS = earnings per share, BE = book value equity per share, TMC = = Dummy 
variable 1 indicates the occurrence of CEO/MD succession (transition year of CEO/MD succession), or 0 for otherwise, TMC_1 = Dummy 
variable 1 indicates a post transition year of CEO/MD succession, or 0 for otherwise, and TMC_C = Dummy variable 1 indicates post 
transition years of CEO/MD succession, or 0 for otherwise.
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utilize accounting choice which reflects an increase in 
reported earnings during their initial years to indicate 
significant improvement under his/her stewardship 
(Bornemann et al. 2015). Insignificant results during 
TMC and TMC_1 can be associated to investor’s perception 
that accounting choice by new CEO/MD is driven by 
opportunistic behavior. Hence, accounting numbers are 
no longer relevant to the investors as they might turn to 
other sources of information to predict firm value.
 Further, we found different results for TMC_C as 
investors react positively toward the interaction between 
CEO/MD succession and EPS (CEPS2) during post transition 
years. Our findings indicate that the coefficient of CEPS2 
is positive and significant to share price at 0.05 level. 
However, the interaction between TMC_C and BE (CBE2) 
is not positively and significantly related to share price. 
Thus, we to conclude that H2 is partly supported. These 
results are consistent with earlier findings from Equation 
2b (example, column 7).
 The findings suggest that investors do consider 
value earnings per share as an indicator in measuring the 
new CEO/MD’s performance during post transition years 
(TMC_C); this is because the capital market expects this 
value to be higher compared to the last period (Kim, 
Sambharya & Yang 2014). This is consistent with Murphy 
and Zimmerman (1993) which indicated EPS, instead of 
book value of equity, is regarded as the most commonly 
used performance measure employed by stakeholders, 
including investors, creditors, regulatory agencies and 
pension funds, etc. These findings also support Ishak et 
al. (2013) which indicated there is an improvement in 
post-succession performance, significantly two years after 
succession events. An improvement may cause investors 
to react positively during TMC_C, which is reflected in 
firm’s share price.
 Origin of the successor might play an important role 
in influencing investors’ perception toward the successor’s 
ability in performing his/her duties. Researchers (Setiawan 
et al. 2011; Shen & Cannella 2002; Kesner & Sebora 1994) 
indicate that origin of successor is an important factor 
that affects firm performance and investors’ reaction. We 
therefore incorporate this variable into our analysis. 
 The objective of H3 is to investigate how the origin of 
successor affects the relationship between share price and 
accounting numbers. To do so, we replaced TMC, TMC_1 
and TMC_C with new variables which indicate the origin 
of successor. For the outsider, we introduce TMCO, TMCO_1 
and TMCO_C; and TMCI, TMCI_1 and TMCI_C to indicate 
new CEO/MD from inside of the organization. We then 
performed separate regression analyses for companies 
with CEO/MD successor from outside and companies with 
CEO/MD from inside of organization. 
 Table 8 presents results for the value relevance of 
BE, EPS and origin of the successor. Consistent with Table 
7, BE and EPS are consistently significant and positively 
related to SP at p< 0.01 for all equations. Columns 2, 3 
and 4 (Equations 4, 4a and 4b) Table 8 present results for 
the regression analyses for firms with CEO/MD successor 
from outside of the organization. The results show that the 
interaction between the occurrences of CEO/MD succession 
and book value of equity per share and earnings per 
share are not significantly and positively related to share 
price at TMC and TMC_C.; i.e. CBE_O, CEPS_O, CBE2_O 
and CEPS 2_O are not significantly related to share price. 
However, during TMC_1 (a year after the transition year), 
we found that CBE1_O, instead of CEPS1_O is positively 
and significantly related to share price at p< 0.01 level. 
This indicates that investors have less confidence on EPS 
for firms with experienced successor from outside of 
organization during TMC_1. The findings support prior 
studies (Bornemann et al. 2015; Tokuga & Yamashita 
2011; Pourciau 1993) which indicate that earnings 
management is strongly linked with outside successor 
because it is said that outsider is under a lot of pressure 
to bring an improved performance/to turn performance 
around after succession (Bornemann et al. 2015; Shen & 
Cannella 2002). Hence, investors lose confidence on EPS 
over firms with outside successor. Thus, they turn to the 
information disclosed in the balance sheet (book value of 
equity) to predict firm value. 
 However, contradictory findings are recorded in the 
cases of companies with successor from inside of the 
organization. Columns 6, 7 and 8 (Equations 5, 5a and 
5b), Table 8 presents results from the regression analyses 
for firms with CEO/MD successor from inside of the 
organization. In contrast to the earlier findings, we found 
the interaction between TMCI_1 and earnings per share 
(CEPS1_I) and the interaction between TMCI_C and earnings 
per share (CEPS2_I) are significantly and positively related 
to share price at p < 0.10 and p < 0.05, respectively. Our 
results indicate that the occurrence of CEO/MD succession 
with inside successor influences the value relevance of 
EPS, but not for the BE. This contradicts the case of outside 
successor, whereby investors have more confidence on 
EPS number for the firm with inside successor. This is 
because investors might believe that insiders have less 
intention to manage earnings; and hence EPS, as disclosed 
in financial statements, reflects the real improvement on 
financial position of the firm. 
 Despite the large number of studies (example, 
Ishak et al. 2013; Jalal & Prezas 2012; Setiawan et al. 
2011; Charitou et al. 2010; Dahya & McConnell 2005) 
documenting evidence that outsider is perceived as more 
beneficial to investors, our study, however, indicates that 
Malaysian investors prefer to insider rather than outsider 
as they have better positive reaction toward firms with 
inside successor. These findings extend the limited studies 
which argued that insider is better due to a smoother 
transition, better social network and a better vision and 
understanding about the firm’s conditions (Setiawan 
2008; Rhim et al. 2006; Dherment-Ferere & Renneboog 
2000; Dalton & Kesner 1985). This situation leads to a 
better firm performance with respect to operations and 
profitability (Rhim et al. 2006). From the above results, 
we conclude that BE is regarded as value relevance 
by the investors after incorporating firm with outside 
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successor. However, EPS is considered as value relevance 
of accounting information for the firm with the inside 
successor. Thus, H3 is partly supported. 
CONCLUSION
Top management plays an important role in firm’s 
operation and businesses (Amran et al. 2014), and 
becomes a key determinant in deciding firm’s strategy, 
design, performance and corporate culture (Rhim et al. 
2006). His or her position is more prominent during top 
management turnovers (Bornemann et al. 2015). Our study 
extends previous studies on top management changes by 
incorporating the effect of CEO/MD succession on the value 
relevance of accounting numbers. Thus, the objective of 
this study is to examine whether the succession of CEO/
MD influences firm’s share price and the value relevance 
of accounting numbers. 
 This study has two important findings. The first finding 
indicates that CEO/MD succession does not influence the 
investors in their decision making during the transition 
year and a year after the transition. However, the result is 
reversed in the longer periods of study. This is because, 
in a short period of time, investors might not be able to 
evaluate the contribution and performance of the new 
CEO/MD. This is consistent with the studies of Ishak et 
al. (2013) and Dahyaa et al. (2000) which concluded that 
improvement in post-succession performance can only be 
realized at least two years after the CEO/MD assumes the 
position. 
 The second finding also indicates that in general, 
the CEO/MD succession has no significant effect on value 
relevance of EPS and BE during short period of time after 
the succession period. Investors do not rely on accounting 
numbers during new CEO/MD’s first and second year 
turnover as they (investors) suspect that accounting 
TABLE 8. Value relevance of book value, earnings and to management change: The origin of successor (n=584)
(White’s heteroscedasticity-correction)
Variables Equation 43 Equation 4a Equation 4b Variables Equation 54 Equation 5a Equation 5b
BE 0.5704 
(4.6952)*
0.5247 
(4.3992)*
0.5028
(3.8946)*
BE 0.6327
(5.0804)*
0.6542 
(5.4128)*
0.7912 
(5.4690)*
EPS 7.1638 
(6.7897)*
7.3845 
(7.2048)*
7.1987 
(6.3495)*
EPS 6.9709
(6.5845)*
6.7302 
(6.5401)*
5.4885 
(5.4690)*
TMCO -0.1636 
(-0.3187)
TMCI 0.5463) 
(1.9741)
CBE_O 0.3701
(0.8936)
CBE_I -0.4418
(-1.4256)
CEPS_O -1.6546 
(-0.6106)
CEPS_I 1.4042
(0.5117)
TMCO_1 -0.6577
(-1.0353)
TMCI_1 0.5110 
(1.6557)***
CBE1_O 1.0740
(2.6055)*
CBE1_I -0.7882 
(-2.4372)**
CEPS1_O -4.7818
(-1.3925)
CEPS1_I 4.9835
(1.8034)***
TMCO_C -0.5174 
(-1.5908)
TMCI_C 03511
(1.3411)
CBE2_O 0.4637 
(1.6254)
 CBE2_I  -0.6347
(-2.4692)**
CEPS2_O -0.7543 
(-0.3241)
CEPS2_I 5.2315
(2.4390)**
Constant 0.2737 
(2.0031)**
0.3065 
(2.3287)**
0.3647 
(2.4956)**
Constant 0.2093
(1.4917)
0.2146
(1.5249)
0.1328 
(0.7870)
Adj R2 0.5872 0.5962 0.5940 Adj R2 0.5882 0.5919 0.6051
F Stat 166.8283* 173.1733* 171.6110* F Stat 167.5223* 170.0820* 179.6941*
Note: Figure in ( ) indicates t-statistic; *, ** and *** indicate significance at p < 0.01, p < 0.05 and p < 0.10 respectively.
SP = share price at four month after financial year end. BE = book value equity per share, EPS = earnings per share, TMCO/TMCI = Dummy variable 1 indicates the 
occurrence of CEO/MD succession with outside/inside/ successor (transition year of CEO/MD succession), or 0 for otherwise, TMCO_1/TMCI_1= Dummy variable 1 
indicates a post transition year of CEO/MD succession with outside/inside successor, or 0 for otherwise, and TMCO_C/ TMCI_C = Dummy variable 1 indicates post 
transition years of CEO/MD succession with outside/inside successor, or 0 for otherwise, CBE_O/I = interaction between TMCO/TMCI and BE, CEPS_O/I = interaction 
between TMCO/TMCI and EPS, CBE1_O/I = interaction between TMCO_1/TMCI_1 and BE, CEPS1_O/I = interaction between TMCO_1/TMCI_1 and EPS, CBE2_O/I 
=interaction between TMCO_C/TMCI_C and BE, and CEPS2_O/I = interaction between TMCO_C/TMCI_C and EPS.
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numbers do not reflect the true firm’s performance. Since 
generally accepted accounting principles provide flexibility 
in selecting accounting methods, new CEO/MD might 
mislead investors and stakeholders by reporting financial 
performance; either to portray bad or good performance 
immediately after the succession as to achieve their 
personal objective. 
 Further analysis incorporating the origin of successor 
(whether from inside or outside of organization) 
demonstrates that BE is regarded as value relevant if 
successors are outsiders. Meanwhile, EPS is considered 
value relevant if the successors are insiders. These 
findings can be interpreted as Malaysian investors have 
more confident on EPS value if firms elect successors from 
inside of the firms. This is because investors might believe 
EPS, as disclosed in financial statements, reflects the real 
improvement on financial position of the firm. 
 This study has limitation. Sample for this study is 
limited to 95 firms, which might not represent all the firms 
which experience CEO/MD succession. Future research 
needs to consider types of succession element and extends 
the period of study to gain better understanding on the 
effect of top management changes on the value relevance 
of accounting numbers. Future research can also extend 
this study by investigating the effect of CEO/MD succession 
on earnings management behavior. 
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NOTES
1. 10 companies had made two announcements on CEO/
MD succession during the period of study. In the case 
of multiple announcements, only announcement in the 
third year after the first announcement is included in 
the study. This is consistent with Pourciau (1995) and 
Guan et al. (2005). This is to allow us associate the 
share prices performance to the first newly appointed 
CEO/MD. 
2. The results are consistent after we exclude TMC from 
the equation.
3.  The results are consistent after we exclude TMC_O from 
the equation.
4.  The results are consistent after we exclude TMC_I from 
the equation.
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